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Abstract
This article revolves around the “Why be moral?” question, a fundamental ethical question 
raised by Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990) in the field of moral development. The study is 
in three parts. In the first part, Introduction, I refer to this fundamental ethical question 
and the questions related to it. In the second part, I compare Kohlberg’s response to 
that question and the questions related to it with those given, implicitly or explicitly, by 
other relevant figures of developmental psychology. Contrary to other developmental 
psychologists, I argue that, for several reasons, Kohlberg’s response to the why be moral 
question is more complete and deeper than that presented by the relevant developmental 
figures analyzed in this article. Despite this, I recognize that, as far as the other questions 
associated with the why be moral question are concerned, all those figures made impor-
tant contributions to a better understanding of one’s moral functioning, and that some of 
them explored moral issues, which, to some extent, were overlooked by Kohlberg. In the 
third part, Final Words, I summarize the main ideas of the paper and enumerate several 
reasons why Kohlberg’s answer to the why be moral question is the most complete and 
deepest one among those presented so far in the field of moral development.   
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Porquê ser moral? Em defesa de uma abordagem Kohlberguiana
Resumo
Este artigo anda em torno da questão “Porquê ser moral?”, uma questão ética fundamental 
levantada por Kohlberg e Ryncarz (1990) no campo do desenvolvimento moral. O artigo 
consta de três partes. Na primeira parte, Introdução, refiro-me a essa questão ética fun-
damental e às questões relacionadas com tal questão. Na segunda, comparo a resposta 
de Kohlberg a todas estas questões com as respostas a tais questões que foram dadas, 
implícita ou explicitamente, por outras figuras relevantes da psicologia do desenvolvimento. 
Ao invés de outros psicólogos do desenvolvimento, argumento que, por razões várias, a 
resposta de Kohlberg à questão por que razão ser moral é mais completa e profunda do 
que a apresentada pelas figuras relevantes do desenvolvimento analisadas neste artigo. Não 
obstante este facto, reconheço que, no que concerne às outras questões associadas com a 
questão do por que razão ser moral, todas essas figuras deixaram contributos para uma 
melhor compreensão do funcionamento moral da pessoa e que algumas delas exploraram 
aspectos morais que, em certa extensão, foram subestimados por Kohlberg. Na terceira 
parte, Palavras Finais, resumo as principais as razões deste artigo e enumero as razões pelas 
quais a resposta de Kohlberg à questão “Porquê ser moral?” é mais completa e profunda 
entre as apresentadas até agora no campo do desenvolvimento moral. 
Palavras-chave: Moralidade; desenvolvimento moral; por que razão ser moral; Kohlberg.
INTRODUCTION
The why be moral question has given rise to much theoretical debate and empiri-
cal research (e.g., Bergman, 2002, 2004; Blasi, 1999, 2004; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; 
Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). This question  in developmental moral psychology was 
posed cogently by Kohlberg & Ryncarz in 1990: “Even after attainment of Stage 
6’s clear awareness of universal principles, a fundamental ethical question still 
remains, namely, ´Why be moral? .` Why be just in a universe that appears unjust? 
This question asks whether there is any support in reality or nature for acting 
according to universal moral principles…” (p. 192). As everyone acquainted with 
Kohlberg’s (e.g., 1981, 1984) theory knows, universal moral principles are revers-
ible principles that should be followed at all times in all moral situations, which 
reminds us of Kant’s (1959) categorical imperative. In other words, principles 
that, as it were, would pass the reversibility test (e.g., “Would I advocate the same 
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solution as that which I defend in a certain moral dilemma if I were in a different 
position in that dilemma?”), and the universalizability test (e.g., “Would I advocate 
the same solution as that which I defend in that moral dilemma if it occurred at 
a different time and place?”).
Although the question, Why be moral?, is markedly philosophical (see Levinas, 
1982; Ricoeur, 2001, and more in the Final Words section), it can also be seen in 
psychological terms, even though, to my knowledge, this question has not yet 
been addressed in empirical terms in the sense posited in the above mentioned 
Kohlbergian and Ryncarzian quotation.
 In a synoptic paper titled “Why be moral? A Conceptual Model from Developmental 
Psychology”, Bergman (2002) elaborates on how relevant figures in developmental 
psychology, Piaget (1977), Kohlberg (1981, 1984; Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990; 
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), Rest (1984, 1986), Colby and Damon (1992, 1995), and 
Blasi (1984, 1985, 1999, 2004), have considered the complex relationships among 
moral reasoning, moral motivation, moral action, and moral identity and, hence, 
how these figures “… implicitly or explicitly answer the question, Why be moral?” 
(Bergman, 202, p. 105). Bergman’s main conclusion is that, among the theories he 
analyzes throughout his paper, Blasi’s moral identity theory (see below) represents 
the best approach to the why be moral question, for “… it combines the insights 
of both Kohlberg, and Colby and Damon.” (Bergman, 2002, p. 122). As suggested 
by the title of this article, I espouse a different view.
 In my understanding, the why be moral question raised by Kohlberg (Kohlberg 
& Ryncarz, 1990, p, 192) appeals, in different degrees, to the six following issues: 1) 
to clarify what means to be moral, the what of morality; 2) to identify the several 
stages of moral development as time goes by, the when of morality; 3) to explain 
the conditions and causes that lead us to be moral, the proximal why of morality; 
4) to understand the varying processes underlying one’s moral-decision making, 
the how of morality; 5) to understand the complex relationships between moral 
cognition and moral behavior, the consistency/inconsistency problem of morality; 
and 6) to speculate and investigate about the ultimate reasons why we must act 
morally in a universe in which the morally sublime coexists with many examples 
of clear immorality and injustice, the distal or final why of morality. 
In what follows, I compare Kohlberg’s response to that question and the ques-
tions related to it with those presented, directly ou indirectly, by other relevant 
figures of developmental psychology. In the process, I argue that, contrary claims 
notwithstanding (e.g., Bergman, 2002), Kohlberg’s approach to the why be moral 
question constitutes a deeper approach than those proposed by other moral research-
ers, such as Piaget, Rest, Colby and Damon, and Blasi. However, one may think 
that there are some aspects referred to above that were analyzed more deeply by 
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some of these moral researchers than by Kohlberg (e.g., the questions of moral 
identity and motivation), an issue I will return later. Turiel’s (1983) and Nucci’s 
(2004) contribution to our understanding of the why be moral question could also 
be analyzed here. I do not refer to their respective contributions to that question 
due to space limits, and for conceptual and methodological reasons whose deep 
analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that these two social 
domain theorists confound prima facie moral judgments or informational knowl-
edge  without any personal moral binding with reversible and universalizable moral 
principles (see Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988), and employ weak methodologies 
(see Lourenço, 2003) to demonstrate what they call” … the sophistication of young 
children’s moral thinking” (Tisak, 1995, p. 96).
KOHLBERG AND PIAGET
In the Introduction of this paper, I stated that the why be moral question 
requires a previous answer to what means to be moral. At the beginning of his 
seminal book, The moral judgment of the child, Piaget (1977) answered this ques-
tion by saying that all morality consists of a system of rules and, hence, what 
is important is to study how, with increasing age, the child acquires the respect 
for these norms and follows them when playing certain games (e.g., the marbles 
game or le jeu des billes). 
In terms of what means to be moral, Kohlberg went far beyond Piaget. It suf-
fices to say that respect for moral norms was seen by Kohlberg only as conven-
tional morality. Post conventional morality is a more advanced morality than the 
conventional one for it implies respect for fundamental moral principles (e.g., 
the principle of justice), not only for moral norms (e.g., not to steal). In addition, 
according to Kohlberg (1971), for an action to be moral, it has to be subjectively 
moral, to appeal to reasons given by subjects whose moral reasoning is post con-
ventional, and also objectively moral, to represent the content, or course of action, 
chosen by post-conventional subjects in hypothetical or real-life moral dilemmas 
(for real-life moral dilemmas, see Gilligan, 1982). 
In contrast to Kohlberg (e.g., Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990), the why be moral 
question was not addressed by Piaget, at least in the deepest sense that such ques-
tion involves, the ultimate reasons why we should be moral. As referred to above, 
what interested Piaget most was the conscience children acquire for certain norms 
and rules (e.g., the marbles game rules), and whether or not they follow them as 
they play that game.  
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However, although Piaget has observed that young children considered 
marbles game rules unalterable and almost sacred, and yet do not follow them 
when playing it, the problem of the consistency/inconsistency between one’s 
moral cognition and one’s moral action was not a problem for Piaget. This is so 
mainly because for him moral judgment and understanding lag behind moral 
behavior. In his words, “[t]hought always lags behind action and cooperation 
has to be practiced for a very long time before its consequences can be brought 
fully to light by ref lective thought.” (Piaget, 1977, p. 64). Contrary to Piaget’s 
position, the consistency/inconsistency problem was a big issue for Kohlberg. 
As he pointed out, “… if there were no conceptually clear relations of judgment 
to action, our philosophic definition of moral action would be falsified empiri-
cally.” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 515; see also Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Empirical 
studies (e.g., Gerson & Damon, 1978) have shown that the consistency between 
moral cognition and moral action tends to increase with one’s level of moral 
development. According to Kohlberg (1984, p. 517), deontic judgments, or judg-
ments of what is right, and responsibility judgments, or judgments to act on what 
one has judged to be right, are partly responsible for such finding. Thus, these 
two types of judgment represent significant mediators and motivational factors, 
between one’s stages or structures of moral reasoning and one’s moral behavior. 
As he said, “[w]e have, then, a model in which the relationship of moral stage to 
(…) moral action is mediated by two intervening judgments, deontic choice [or 
judgment] and responsibility judgments.” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 518). The finding 
that the morally more advanced individuals are those who are more likely to 
convert their deontic judgments into responsibility judgments (e.g., McNamee, 
1978) supports Kohlberg’s claim about the role of one’s moral structures, deontic 
judgments and responsibility judgments in one’s moral action.
Contrary to Kohlberg’s interest in cognitive moral motivation (see above), 
questions of moral motivation play no explicit role in Piaget’s theory of moral-
ity. Piaget (1977) was most interested in what leads the child to act according to 
an autonomous morality, a morality guided by cooperation, equality, and mutual 
respect, or according to a heteronomous morality, a morality appealing to simple 
obedience, constraint out of fear, and unilateral respect. Whereas heteronomous 
morality results from asymmetrical, adult-child interactions, autonomous morality 
arises from symmetrical, child-child interactions. Kohlberg’s theory also distin-
guished these two forms of morality (see Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, pp. 315-380). 
However, because he studied moral development mainly among adolescents and 
adults, Kohlberg (1976, 1984) identified six structural stages of moral reasoning 
and a meta-ref lexive stage 7 (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990). As we will see, according 
to Kohlberg, the why be moral question has much to do with his stage 7.
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To sum up, Piaget was not concerned with the why be moral question, and 
regarding other issues having to do, to some extent, with this question, to elabo-
rate on what means to be moral, for instance, Kohlberg went further than Piaget.
KOHLBERG AND REST
The why be moral question was also not addressed by James Rest, though 
his approach to moral development has been greatly inf luenced by Kohlberg’s 
theory. However, in addition to having developed an instrument to evaluate the 
individual’s level of moral reasoning, his well-known Defining Issues Test or DIT 
(Rest, 1979), which is different from that developed by Kohlberg and his col-
laborators (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, b), Rest was mainly interested in the inner 
processes or components that lead to moral behavior. His four components model 
(see Rest, 1984; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) describes one’s moral 
functioning in the following way: First, we interpret a given situation as moral 
or not moral, component 1 or moral sensitivity; second, we formulate the moral 
ideal in that situation, component 2 or moral judgment; third, we decide whether 
or not to pursue the moral ideal or moral judgment previously formulated, com-
ponent 3 or moral motivation; fourth, we act in order to implement the decision 
taken before, component 4 or one’s character attributes, such as perseverance, 
firm resolve, and strong will, etc.
Rest considered his four components model regarding the relationship between 
moral cognition and moral action much different from that presented by Kohlberg 
(1976, 1984; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Rest disagrees with Kohlberg, mainly 
because, besides other aspects: 1) “[r]easoning about justice is no more the whole of 
morality…” (1984, p.32); 2) “moral values are not the only values that people have 
“ (Rest, 1986, p. 13); 3) ‘…moral behavior is an exceedingly complex phenomenon 
and no single variable (empathy, prosocial orientation, stages of moral reasoning, 
etc.) is sufficiently comprehensive to represent the psychology of morality (Rest, 
1986, p.18); 4) moral motivation plays no role in Kohlberg’s ideas on the moral 
cognition/moral action question; and 5), at its best, Kohlberg’s model of the rela-
tionship of moral cognition to moral action, (see above) has only something to 
say about component 2 as well as component 3 of his four components model. In 
other words, Rest saw some resemblances between component 2 of his model, to 
formulate the moral ideal in the situation at hand, and Kohlberg’s (1984, p. 517) 
concept of deontic judgment, “… a judgment of what is right.”; and also some 
similitude between component 3 of his model, to decide whether to pursue that 
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moral ideal, and Kohlberg’s (1984, p. 517) idea of “… a judgment of responsibility 
to act on what one has judged to be right.” 
Confronted with the above mentioned points raised against Kohlberg by Rest, 
a Kohlbergian oriented developmental psychologist could say that, although justice 
is for Kohlberg (1971, p. 220) “…the basic moral principle”, for him, too, reasoning 
about justice is not the whole of morality. As previously seen, moral action, for 
instance, not only reasoning about justice has a room in Kohlberg’s theory. Contrary 
to Rest’s suggestion that moral values are, for Kohlberg, the only values that people 
have, it suffices to remember that, for him, “[t]he basic motivation for morality 
is rooted in a generalized motivation for acceptance, competence, self-esteem, or 
self-realization.” (Kohlberg, 1987, p. 312).  This Kohlberg’s quotation also shows 
that it is simply wrong to say that moral motivation plays no role in Kohlberg’s 
ideas on the relationship of moral cognition to moral action. 
(Rest, 1986, p. 18) suggests that, for Kohlberg, moral behavior is not an exceed-
ingly complex phenomenon. Nowhere have I seen that, for Kohlberg, moral behavior 
is a simple phenomenon, something that can be explained by a single variable. In 
addition to what was already said regarding Kohlberg’s model of the relationship of 
moral cognition to moral action, one may still add that he explicitly recognized that 
one can reason in terms of moral principles and not to live in accordance with them 
and, hence, that there are also multiple situational factors which determine whether, 
in a given situation, one lives according to one’s moral reasoning (see Kohlberg, 
1976, p.32). One may still think (see Bergman, 2002, 2004) that Kohlberg’s model of 
the relationship of moral cognition to moral action also involves four components, 
which make us think of Rest’s four processes model: First, moral stage and moral 
type (i.e., type A or heteronomous type; type B, or autonomous type), component 
1, which leads one to interpret a situation as moral or not moral; Second, deontic 
judgments, component 2, which lead one to see what action is right or obligatory; 
third, responsibility judgments, component 3, which lead one to decide to act on 
what one has judged to be right; fourth, moral action, component 4, that is, to 
act according to what one has judged to be right. It is worth mentioning that, for 
Kohlberg, the move from a decision to act (component 3) to the implementation of 
this decision (component 4) can be inf luenced by not moral values, chief ly among 
them the ego strength or strong will. Again, this shows considerable similarity with 
one’s character attributes, such as perseverance, firm resolve, competence, etc., 
attributes that lie also at the heart of component 4 of Rest’s model.   
In summary, Rest never addressed the why be moral question in the foundational 
and philosophical sense that it involves for Kohlberg. With respect to other issues 
related, to some extent, to this question, to assess one’s level of moral develop-
ment, for instance, Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test is far from being so deep as is 
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Kohlberg’s (1987a,b) methodology. In the same vein, Rest’s (1984) four components 
model is not, as he claimed, so different from that presented by Kohlberg (1984; 
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).
KOHLBERG, AND DAMON AND COLBY
Regarding the study of moral development as well as the why be moral question, 
Damon (1984) and Colby (Colby & Damon, 1992, 1993, 1995) see their theory as 
an alternative to that of Kohlberg. Succinctly, their approach involves three main 
claims: First,” [a] person’s level of moral judgment does not determine the person’s 
views on morality’s place in one’s life. To know how an individual deals with this 
latter issue, we must know about not only the person’s moral beliefs but also the 
person’s understanding of the self in relation to these moral beliefs.” (Damon, 1984, 
p. 110); second, as development goes on, there is an increasing integration between 
the self and morality, that is, “[o]ne’s moral interests and self-interests become 
more clearly defined and connected to each other…” (Damon, 1984, p.109); Third, 
this integration is so great in  moral exemplars, persons who had been nominated 
as such by some moral philosophers, theologians, ethicists, historians, and social 
scientists, because of their contribution to peace, civil rights, religious freedom 
etc., that none of them “saw their moral choice as an exercise in self-sacrifice.” 
(Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 303, emphasis in original). In other words, not to act 
morally would be for these moral exemplars to give up their selves, personalities, 
or identities. “They performed their moral actions spontaneously, as if they had 
no choice in the matter.” (p. 300). It is worth mentioning that, when they were 
assessed in their moral reasoning in an abbreviated Kohlbergian moral judgment 
interview (i.e., the Heinz dilemma), their scores ranged from stage 3 (2 subjects), to 
stage 5 (4 subjects), with the majority (13 subjects) scoring at 4 or 4/5 stages (Colby 
& Damon, 1992, p. 328). There were no stage 6 individuals. In short, Colby and 
Damon (1992, 1995) wanted to challenge Kohlberg’s insistence on the centrality of 
moral reasoning and the idea that Kohlberg’s moral stages predict moral behavior.
It is true that moral reasoning plays a central role in Kohlberg’s theory of 
morality. However, instead of being a shortcoming, such as Damon and Colby 
suggest, Kohlberg’s focus on the centrality of moral reasoning is a greatness of his 
theory. Without knowing the cognitive reasons behind our actions, there are acts 
appearing to be moral that are immoral ultimately. Cooperation, for instance, is 
generally presented as a mark of an autonomous and advanced morality (see, for 
instance, Piaget, 1977). What is moral in an act of cooperation in order to steal 
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the goods of a given Institute of Social Solidarity?  And, contrary to Colby and 
Damon’s (1992, 1995) suggestion, Kohlberg’s moral stages per se do not allow to 
predict one’s moral behavior. As already mentioned, deontic judgments, responsi-
bility judgments (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 517), self-esteem, self-realization (Kohlberg, 
1987, p. 312), situational factors (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 32), etc., also play a role in the 
passage from moral cognition to moral action. In terms of moral motivation, an 
issue that lies at the heart of Damon (1984) and Colby’s (Colby & Damon, 1992) 
approach, they ignore that moral cognition has also an intrinsic motivational power. 
It is not mere coincidence that none of the moral exemplars they interviewed were 
pre-conventional, some scored at stage 5, and the majority at stage 4 or at stage 
4/5 (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 328). It remains to be known what scores would be 
obtained by those moral exemplars if their moral reasoning had been assessed by 
using a complete, instead of an abbreviated, moral judgment interview (see Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987a, b). In addition to this, Colby and Damon are silent about the 
moral type (i.e., type A, or heteronomous type, and type B, or autonomous type; 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, a, pp. 315-380) of their moral exemplars. This distinction 
would have been important because of Kohlberg’s discovery that a “type B person 
is someone who intuitively (…) perceives the central values and obligations (…), 
and uses these intuitions to generate a judgment of responsibility or necessity in a 
dilemma” (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984, p. 63). This means that a type B individual 
may act in concert with stages more advanced than his moral stage. Given that in 
his last method for assessing individuals’ moral stage (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, b), 
Kohlberg abandoned his idea of stage 6 as an empirical reality, it is also surprising 
that Colby and Damon (1992, p. 328) mention that none of their moral exemplars 
scored at stage 6. One may still think that Kohlberg’s (1987) suggestion that the 
basic motivation for morality also includes one’s “self-realization” (p.312, emphasis 
added ) reminds us, to an extent, of Damon’s (1984) idea that “[s]ome [individu-
als] consider their morality to be central to their self-identities (…) [while] others 
consider it to be peripheral.” (p. 110).   
 As far as the why be moral question is concerned, one may think that Colby 
and Damon’s (1992, 1995) approach has more to do with what leads one to act 
morally (i.e., the integration of self and morality) than with the ultimate reason 
why one ought to be moral in a universe full with examples of injustice. In addi-
tion, one may still think that Colby and Damon’s (1992, 1995) idea that persons 
act morally to maintain their selves, personalities, or identities, is an idea that 
may lead to a kind of “ethical egoism” (Nucci, 2004, p. 122; see also Moshman, 
2004). In other words, we would be moral, not because of our concerns for others, 
but because of our concerns with ourselves. In this regard, Damon and Colby 
are far from Kohlberg’s more universal idea that we should treat others as an 
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end in themselves, not as a means for our ends, however advanced these ends 
may be. More to the point, according to Kohlberg, the ultimate reason for one 
to be moral is related to his meta-ref lexive, not structural, stage 7. In Kohlberg’s 
words, “In the state of mind I metaphorically term Stage 7, we identify ourselves 
with the cosmic or infinite perspective and value life from its standpoint. (…). If 
we are aware of the relationship of all people and things to the whole of Nature, 
then we continue to love the whole in spite of the disappointments or losses.” 
(Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, pp. 192-196). To put it simply, according to Damon 
(1984) and Colby (Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995), we are moral to live in harmony 
with our selves, personalities, and identities. For Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 
1990), we should be moral, not only for living in harmony with ourselves, but for 
living in harmony with the whole of Nature, in harmony, that is, with ourselves, 
with all people and even with all things. One may object that this Kohlberg’s 
answer to the why be moral question is more philosophical than psychological. 
Although true, such an objection misses the point for it forgets that the why 
be moral question, as well as the why live question, is from its very beginning 
more philosophical than psychological. Kohlberg’s position has the advantage of 
elaborating on both aspects.    
 To sum up, with their idea of the unity between self and morality as an answer 
to the why be moral question, Colby and Damon (1992, 1995) brought to light 
the importance of non cognitive motivations for one to be moral, an aspect that 
Kohlberg’s theory overlooks. In spite of this, Kohlberg’s answer to such question 
seems to me to be deeper than that offered by Colby and Damon. First, as seen 
before, non cognitive motivational dimensions for one to be moral also play a role 
in Kohlberg’s theory; second, compared to Kohlberg’s views, Damon and Colby 
almost ignore the role of moral reasoning in their approach to morality. Given 
that moral reasoning is a requisite for an action to be judged moral or immoral, 
any approach to the why be moral question that ignores such requisite partly loses 
its raison d’être. Finally, and more important, Kohlberg’s approach to the why 
be moral question addresses philosophical issues totally ignored by Damon and 
Colby’s theory. Needless to say, even the question of what means to be moral already 
lifts up philosophical aspects, as is easily visible in the different ways how moral 
psychologists and moral philosophers consider an action to be moral or just. For 
example, for Kohlberg (1984), to be moral is not to treat others unfairly or to follow 
the principle of justice; For Gilligan (1982), is not to abandon others in need or to 
follow the principle of benevolence. For Bentham (1983), is to assure the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number or to follow the principle of utilitarianism; and 
for Den Wyl (1991), is to follow the Aristotlian  principle of eudaimonia (a  Greek 
word), or to pursue our self-fulfillment and happiness.
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KOHLBERG AND BLASI
Blasi (1984, 1990, 1995, 2004), like Rest, and Damon and Colby, did not feel 
totally satisfied with Kohlberg’s theory regarding the passage from moral cognition 
to moral action, and hence, with his approach to the why be moral question. As 
he pointed out: “We need a psychological theory to explain how and why moral 
understanding leads, when it does, to the desire to act morally.”(Blasi, 1990, p. 53).
At the heart of Blasi’s theory, known as self model (Blasi, 1983) or moral 
identity (1984), lie mainly the four following theses: first, “[t]he transition from 
a judgment of responsibility to action is supported dynamically by the tendency 
toward consistency, a central tendency in personality organization.” (Blasi, 1983, 
p. 201); second, “not to act according to one’s judgment should be perceived as a 
substantial inconsistency, as a fracture within the very core of the self …” (Blasi, 
1983, p. 201, emphasis added); third, “… morality and identity or the self-concept 
are separate psychological systems which only slowly, and sometimes imperfectly, 
come together and become integrated.” (Blasi, 1995, p. 229). To justify this third 
thesis, Blasi (1989, 1995) tends to appeal to two types of data. One type has to do 
with a Blasi’s research on the degree of personal integration of moral responsibility 
among three groups of children with average ages of 6, 12, and 17. Results have 
shown that “… the sense of personal obligation is largely absent among 6-year-
olds, but it is well understood by the large majority of 12-year-olds (…). In many 
17-year-olds the sense of obligation is tied to personally held beliefs and the sense 
of personal integrity.” (Blasi, 1989, p. 126, emphasis added). The other type of data 
has to do with research on the happy victimizer phenomenon (e.g., Doherty, 2008; 
Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalback, 2003; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988), which 
shows that even though children younger than 8-9-year-olds tend to judge certain 
moral transgressions (e.g., stealing) to be wrong, they end up by attributing positive 
emotions, to feel good, for instance, to the transgressor. In Blasi’s (1989) words, 
this result reveals that “…moral understanding appears to be possible without it 
being integrated with the appropriate emotions and motives.” (p. 125). Finally, “… 
moral understanding eventually acquires its own motivational power, one, namely, 
that is intrinsic in the nature itself of morality…”. (Blasi, 1995, p. 237, emphasis 
in original). 
Because of what I said so far, it is easily visible that the first three theses of Blasi’s 
approach (i.e., we are moral to maintain our consistency; to maintain our identity; 
when it occurs, the integration of morality and identity is a developmental process) 
are similar to those of Colby and Damon (1992, 1995), namely, to their idea that 
one acts morally when there is an integration of self and morality, and relatively 
inconsistent with Kohlberg’s ideas regarding the passage from moral cognition to 
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moral action. If these first three theses of Blasi’s approach are somehow inconsist-
ent with Kohlberg’s ideas concerning the passage from moral cognition to moral 
action, the fourth thesis of Blasi’s approach (i.e., moral understanding has its own 
motivational power) is based on Kohlberg’s (1971, 1984) thinking, and plays no role 
in Colby and Damon’s (1992, 1993, 1995) approach. The inf luence of Kohlberg’s 
theory on Blasi’s thinking is also visible in his idea that the importance of self or 
identity to moral motivation does not imply to downplay the role of moral judgment. 
In his words: “… the self ’s very identity is constructed, at least in part, under the 
inf luence of moral reasons…”. (Blasi, 1984, p. 138, emphasis added). This means 
that, contrary to Colby and Damon’s approach, Blasi’s theory of moral identity 
preserves the centrality of moral judgment in moral action and development. In 
other words, compared to the theories already presented, Blasi’s approach combines 
the insights of both Kohlberg, and Colby and Damon.
It is true that, with his theory of moral identity, theory according to which one 
would lose his or her identity if he or she did not act morally, Blasi (1983, 1984, 
1995, 2004) brought to light the importance of non-cognitive motivational dimen-
sions to explain why we act morally. However, it should be noted that Kohlberg’s 
(1987, p. 312) idea that self-esteem, or self-realization are motivations for moral 
action reminds us, to some extent, of the first two theses of Blasi’s approach (i.e., 
we act morally to be self-consistent and preserve our identity). Similarly, Blasi’s 
idea that the sense of moral obligation increases with age is also a Kohlbergian 
thesis. Actually, at pre-conventional stages there is only a sense of pseudo moral 
obligation. In its deepest meaning, moral obligation appears only at post conven-
tional stages. According to some others (e.g., Lourenço, 2003), post conventional 
stages make us think of “necessary” moral knowledge, a type of knowledge which 
leads us to act morally, as if an internal moral compulsion were the case. It is this 
moral obligation or “necessary” moral knowledge that, I believe, lies at the heart 
of Kohlberg’s (1971, p. 232) thesis that “… who knows the good chooses the good.” 
Because of these reasons, it seems to me to be a bit exaggerated Blasi’s claim that 
“[w]e need a psychological theory to explain how and why moral understanding 
leads, when it does, to the desire to act morally.” (Blasi, 1990, p. 53).  
Regarding the answer to the why be moral question, I think that Blasi went 
further than Rest, Damon and Colby, but not so far as Kohlberg. Rest, Damon and 
Colby were mainly interested in identifying the inner processes and dimensions 
which lead us to be moral in challenging situations. In addition to these aspects, 
Blasi (1984. p. 438) was also interested in the more fundamental question, “What 
kind of person should one, or must one, be?, a question he distinguishes from the 
question,“ What kind of person I want to be?” (see Bergman, 2004, p. 35). As already 
mentioned, Blasi answers that we should be moral for not opening “… a fracture 
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within the very core of the self …” (Blasi, 1983, p. 201, emphasis added), an answer 
which, like that given by Colby and Damon, may lead us to think of a certain 
ethical egoism (see Nucci, 2004). As referred to earlier, Kohlberg’s answer to the 
why be moral question is more philosophical, foundational, and comprehensive. 
We ought to be moral for not opening a fracture within the cosmos or the whole 
of nature. As he said, “…[I]n the state of mind I metaphorically term Stage 7, we 
identify ourselves with the cosmic or infinitive perspective (…). If we are aware of 
the relationship of all people and things to the whole of Nature, then we continue 
to love the whole…”. (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, pp. 192-196, emphasis added). 
The fact that Kohlberg uses here the term to love the whole seems to mean that, 
for him, contrary claims notwithstanding (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995), to 
be moral implies heart and reason, not only reason.
To sum up, with his theory of moral identity, Blasi enhanced our understand-
ing of Damon and Colby’s (1992) idea that the unity of self and morality plays an 
important role in moral motivation and action.  However, contrary to such Damon 
and Colby’s idea, Blasi’s (2004) theory does not downplay the role of moral judgment, 
which renders his theory consistent with a central tenet of Kohlberg’s approach. In 
this vein, it is worth mentioning that the role of reason in one’s moral judgments 
and decisions, which is central in Piaget’s (1977), and Kohlberg’s (1984) moral 
theories, is now being dismissed by a reductionist and anti-rationalist tendency in 
many fields of psychology whose whole description, strengths, and shortcomings 
is beyond the scope of this article. For example, according to Haidt’s (2001) social 
intuitionist model, we first form our moral judgments and decisions with basis 
on intuitions and emotions and then give reasons for them, our reasons serving 
as ex-post facto rationalizations to convince ourselves/others that our moral judg-
ments and decisions are a reason-based process. As previously argued, to ignore 
or even overlook the role of moral reasoning in any moral theory amounts to not 
having any moral theory at all (see Kasachkoff & Saltzstein, 2006). It suffices to say 
that moral reasons are part and parcel of the definition of the moral action itself. 
Concerning the why be moral question, Blasi, as we have just shown, treated it 
mainly in the sense of viewing what leads one to act morally. In addition to tak-
ing into account this aspect, Kohlberg, by relating the why be moral question to 
the why live question, a question which is more philosophical than psychological, 
went farther than Blasi.
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FINAL WORDS 
In this article, I have analyzed, in a summary way, the contribution of Piaget 
(1977), Rest (1983, 1984), Colby and Damon (1992, 1995), and Blasi (1983, 1984, 
2004) to our understanding of the fundamental ethical question: Why be moral? 
Such analysis was made by comparing the contribution of each of these authors to 
that of Kohlberg (1981, 1984, 1987; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 
1990).  In the process, I also elaborated on other issues having to do with this fun-
damental question, namely, what means to be moral; what leads one to act morally 
in challenging moral situations; what processes underlie one’s moral-decision mak-
ing; and what are the complex relationships of moral cognition to moral action.  
To sum up, Piaget (1977) did not address the why be moral question in the 
deep sense that Kohlberg raised it. He was, however, one of the first developmental 
psychologists to give a definition of what means to be moral. In contrast to the 
other authors on whom I elaborated, for Piaget the problem was not to explain the 
passage from moral cognition to moral action, but the passage from moral action 
to moral cognition.
Rest (1983, 1984; Rest et al., 1999) did not address either the why be moral 
question in its deepest sense. He was mainly interested in identifying the inner 
processes underlying the passage from one’s moral cognition to one’s moral action, 
having then formulating his four components model.
Non cognitive moral motivations play a substantial role in Damon and Colby’s 
theory (Colby & Damon, 1992, 1993, 1995; Damon, 1984). According to Colby and 
Damon, we act morally when morality becomes a dominant characteristic of the 
self, this being particularly notorious in the moral exemplars they interviewed. This 
answer, however, shows that for them the why be moral question is more a ques-
tion about what leads one to act morally than a question about why we should be 
moral. This means that Colby and Damon did not elaborate on the why be moral 
question in its deepest meaning. 
The role of moral motivation in the passage from moral cognition to moral 
action is also stressed in Blasi’s (1983, 1984, 2004) moral identity theory. According 
to Blasi, we act morally to preserve our identity and, hence, not to betray the self. 
This Blasi’s answer shows that, in spite of his distinction between the question, 
What kind of person must one be?, and the question, What kind of person I want 
to be?”, he addressed mainly the latter, not the former. In this respect, it is telling 
that, when Blasi (1990, p. 53) mentions that we need a theory to explain how and 
why moral judgment leads, when it does, to moral action, he refers to a desire, not 
to an obligation. This means that the why be moral question in its deepest and 
philosophical sense was not addressed either by Blasi. To answer to the why be 
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moral question by appealing to a desire, not to an obligation, raises the following 
more than legitimate problem: Am I not obliged to be moral if I do not desire to 
act morally? In short, Kohlberg’s question, Why be moral?, was transformed by 
Blasi into the question, “Why I want be moral?.
As suggested throughout this article, I think that Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984; Kohlberg, 
Boyd, & Levine, 1990; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) theory constitutes the deepest 
approach to the fundamental ethical question, Why be moral?. Among others, for 
the five following reasons: 1) It was Kohlberg who first raised such question in 
moral developmental psychology; 2) it was him who presented a more demanding 
idea of what means to be moral; 3) his approach deals with all aspects eventually 
related to such question, namely, what leads one to be moral, what processes are 
involved in the passage from moral cognition to moral action, what leads one to 
act, or not to act, on one’s moral judgments. Finally, and more important, it was 
Kohlberg who gave the more profound answer to that question, for his response 
involves not only psychological, but also philosophical, aspects. That is, his answer 
to such question points to the more likely variables which lead us to be  moral, but 
also to the reasons why we are obliged to be moral. Damon, Colby and Blasi defend 
that we are moral in order to not introduce a fracture within the very core of the 
self, and maintain our integrity and identity. Kohlberg answers that we should be 
moral to maintain the unity of the whole and ourselves or to identify ourselves 
with a cosmic or infinite perspective. As he has proclaimed: “If we are aware of 
the relationship of all people and things to the whole of Nature, then we continue 
to love the whole in spite of disappointments or losses.” (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 
1990, p. 196). This means that Kohlberg’s response to the why be moral question 
contains a spiritual, not necessarily religious, dimension, which is not visible in 
any theory I succinctly analyzed throughout this article. This spiritual albeit not 
religious dimension is visible in the natural law perspective to which appeals 
Kohlberg’s stage 7. As he put it, “[s]tage 7’s natural law perspective stands in sharp 
contrast to [both the] divine command theory…[and the] emotivist theory. The 
first … is a fundamentalist theory that states that morality is ultimately defined 
or rests upon divine command as revealed by the Bible or other      documents of 
revelation. The second…states that morality is in part and religion is altogether 
an ‘illusion’ born of irrational human fantasy and conflict” (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 
1990, p. 196). This is the reason why Kohlberg’s moral theory and his answer to 
the why be moral questions is secular rather than religious. As a result, we all are 
obliged to be moral, regardless of our religious believes or our emotional conflicts 
and fantasies. 
Of course, it would be interesting to discuss the “Why be moral?” question 
itself. I mean to deconstruct it and try to rephrase it in different ways to assess 
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whether it couldn’t have a “bigger heuristic value” or moral interest if reconstructed 
in such or such a way. For example, both Ricoeur (2001) and Levinas (1982) gave 
an anthropologic origin to the moral behaviour and reasoning. Ricoeur named 
this fundamental human characteristic: the ethical intention (in French: la visée 
éthique). He defined this intention, notably, as the care for distant others, for 
fair institutions and for a good personal life. Levinas went even further in this 
direction when he related this intention with an absolutely primordial formative 
experience, which he called: “the face” (in French: le “visage”). As far as I know, 
these two thinkers and ideas have not yet been explored empirically by psycholo-
gists in spite of their heuristic value for our understanding of the “Why be moral 
question?” The same could be said, for instance, about the Canadian philosopher 
Charles Taylor’s (1989) thesis that the self can exist only within a moral space, and 
the German philosopher Hans Jonas’ (1984) idea of his imperative of responsibility. 
I think that these important thinkers and ideas will have a major impact on the 
psychologists’ theoretical debate and empirical research. 
Needless to say that the present article followed a different track, namely to show 
and argue that, compared to other developmental psychologists, it was Kohlberg 
who addresses the fundamental ethical questions, Why be moral?, in a deepest way.
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